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TORTS 
GEORGEJ.ALEXANDER 
This year ,  the Court o f  A ppeals had the opportunity t o  consider a 
number of basic questions in  the field . I t  announced a strict liability rule for 
blasting, held that the statute of  limitations in malpractice cases resulting 
from foreign objects being left in the body does not begin to run until the fact 
was discovered, allowed to plaintiffs both proof of specific acts of negligence 
and reliance on res ipsa loquitur in the same case, and overruled interfamilial 
tort im munity for negligent torts. It refused to allow causes of action to 
bystanders for mental distress, denied liability for a failure of police protection 
absent the assurance of protection, and for the wrongful death of a fetus. In  
deciding these important questions, it had occasion to restate i t s  perception 
of the role of courts in legal innovation several times and at some length. 
Other decisions further reduced the impact of the statutory right of 
privacy provisions on comments concerning public figures. One case held that 
failure o f  restraint of confined mental patients could be judged by a jury 
without the assistance of medical expertise. The usual range of luminaries were 
in  court litigating their right to  privacy or their right to publicity: Barry 
Goldwater, Howard Hughes, Mrs. Ernest Hemingway, Ayn Rand and Patrick 
Paulsen . The first and last members o f  the group sued for what they 
considered improprieties connected with their respective campaigns for the 
presidency of the United States. 
TORT LIABILITY OF THE STATE 
Last year's Survey reviewed the difficulty the third department has had 
in defining the bounds of state responsibility for policemen whose emergency 
action against supposed law vioi-ators injures innocent third parties.) This year 
brought another chase with resultant injury to innocent persons on the 
highway.2 Like last year's case, the circumstances were quite bizzare. After 
attempting to stop the driver of a stolen car several times by other methods, 
and after a chase on a highway with traftic running in both directions at 
speeds of up to ninety miles an hour, three chasing patrol cars decided to 
wedge the offender between their respective cars and accordingly brought their 
cars into position. The driver of the stolen car swerved to the left, impacted 
with one of the police cars and the two cars in unison careened into the lane 
reserved for traffic going in the opposite direction, where they severely injured 
p la int i ffs, who were sitt ing in  their car a t  a light. I n  holding the state 
Georg.: J. Alexander is Professor of Law at the Syracuse University College of Law and a 
member oftht  New York. Illinois and United States Supreme Court Bars. 
I .  Alexander. Torts. 1968 SUrl'ey of New York Law. 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 424 ( 1969). 
dNlIssillg Stanton v. State. 29 App. Div. 2d 6 1 2. 285 N.Y.S.2d 964 (3d Dep't (967). 
2. Jansen \'. State, 60 !\lisc. 2d 36. 30 1 N.Y.S.2d 8 1 1  (Ct. CI. 1968). 
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responsible for the injuries the Court of Claims distinguished Sra1ll011 \' . .  "'lalt" 
by asserting that the injury in Sralllon was caused by the pur�U\:d car for 
which the state is not responsible, while in the instant case "the collision 
between the fleeing car and the claimant's automobile occurred at least in part 
as a result of a plan of action deliberately formulated by the two police 
officers after conferring over their car radios."l Having said that. the court 
concluded that several less risky alternatives were available to the stal\: In 
order to effect the apprehension, and that the police \\ere demonstrably 
negligent in having chosen this particular plan.:; The appellate divi�iun 
affirmed unanimously without opinion." 
While it seems commendable for the Court of Claims to have found a 
way to reimburse an innocent bystander on these facts, the asserlC'd distindion 
between the instant case and Stallloll is probably not to be taken too seriou .. l� . 
While the question of less risky alternatives would certainly seem rele\'ant 111 
establishing a case of negligence against the state, it would seem an injury 
resulting from the chase, whether occasioned by the fleeing vehide. the 
pursuing vehicle, or, as in this case, a combination of both, \\ ould st:em hardly 
relevant to the question of the state's culpability in rejecting less ri .. \.� 
alternatives. Indeed, the notion that emergency vehicles art: to be hdd tu 
reasonable care under the circumstances despite the exemption of Section 110..+ 
of the Vehicle and Traffic Law' urged by the appellees in the appella!\: 
divisionS appears a far more convincing explanation of the result in Jall\('/1 
than does the court's rationale. Certainly. the statute is capable of either the 
construction given it in Jansen or that in Stanton. A judicial choice in favor 
of compensating innocent persons incidently injured in the process of police 
administration where the injury was avoidable by the exercise of grealt:r car\.' 
seems more appropriate a resolution of the conflicting interests of the public\" 
safety and the state in the administration of criminal justice. This seems ewn 
clearer in cases such as the instant one where the offender appears to threal\:n 
only property interests while bystanders are threatened in life and limb. 
The responsibility of the state. acting through its police. for the safet� 01 
its citizens was quite forcefully denied in another context by the C our! tIl 
Appeals in Riss v. City of .Yell' YorV In that case plaintiff h:ld refu .. ed to 
date the person from whom she sought police protection. He in turn had 
threatened over a period of about ten months that. if she per-.i-.ted in her 
refusal. he would retaliate physically. Though she made several complaint .. tc> 
the police at this point. after investigation they refused to intervene. On thl.' 
3. 29 App. Div. 2d 6 1 2. 285 N .Y.S.2d 964 (3d Dep't 1967). 
4. Jansen v. StalP-. supra note 2. at 42. 30 I N. Y.S.2d at 8 1 �. 
5. Id. at 44. 301 N .  Y.S.2d at 820. 
6. Jansen v. State. 32 App. Div. 2d 889. 302 N .  Y.S.2d 10 16  Hth Dep't 1%9) 
7. N .Y. VEHlClE.I: T. LAW § 1 1 04 (McKinney 1960). 
8. Brief for Appellee at 12- 1 3. Jansen v. State. supra note 6. 
9. 22 N .  Y.2d 579. 240 N.E.2d 860. 293 N. Y.S.2d 897 ( 1 968). 
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night of a party to celebrate her engagement to another, plaintiff received a 
threatening tdephone call from her tormentor, who informed her that this was 
her last chance. Presumably this was intended to convey the notion that the 
caller would now make good on his melodramatic threat, "If I can't have you, 
no one else will have you, and when I get through with you, no one else will 
want you:'I" She again called the police, but they refused protection. The next 
morning Iy..: was thrown in her face, destroying sight in one eye, causing 
partial loss of vision in the other eye. an'd leaving her face disfigured. Although 
not repudiating the holding in Schuster \'. City 0.1 .Yell" }'ork,1I the Court 
lImited the �tate's responsibility to specific undertakings of responsibility to 
partkular members of the public. 
An informer. promised protection, may presumably still be covered for 
a neglIgent failure to provide it. Other members of the public have no claim. 
Judge Keating wrote a strong dissenting opinion.'2 He pointed out, among 
other things. that private citizens were required to rely on police protection 
bccau�e �tate law prohibits arming in self-defenseP He took the opportunity 
to re"ie\\ extensively the demise of sovereign immunity and indicated his 
feeling that the Court should not await legislative action to alter the present 
ruk." The majority and Judge Keating view the Court's role differently. The 
majorit} bdieves "there is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper 
allucation of powers of government for the courts, in the absence of 
kgl',lation. to carve out an area of tort liability for police protection to 
mel1ber� of the public:'!:; While Judge Keating tinds some cases supporting 
thc Court"s concern, he believes that "what is of importance here are .cases 
. . . [\\ hich] signify the direction in which the law is proceeding. They indi"ate 
how. step by step. �ew York courts are moving to return-albeit with some 
notabk sdbacks--toward the day when the government. in carrying out its 
various functions. will be held equally responsible for the negligent acts of its 
cmplo)ces as would a private employer."I'; He concludes: 
Th� ruk I' Judg.: mad.: [,i<) and can be judicially modified. By statute, the judicially 
.:rC:.JII:d doctrin.: of 'sovereign immunity' was d.:stroyed. It was.arr unrighteous doctrine . 
.. .Jrrymg a� It did the connotatIOn that th.: gon;rnm.:nt is above the la\\. Likewise, the 
1.1\\ ,hould be purg<:d of all nc\\ evasions. \\ hich st:ek to avoid thi.! full implications of 
Ihe r..:pc,11 01 'l)\<:reign Immunity. 
'\;0 doubt in the future \\e shall have to draw limitations just as \\e ha\'.: don.: in 
the ar..:a of prj\'.Jt.., litig-ltion. and no doubt some of these limitations will be unique to 
mum<.:lpal h-lbllity bccau,,; th.: problems will not have any count.:rpart in private tort law. 
Bul If the Itn.:, an.: to be drawn. kt th.:m be delineated on candid considerations of policy 
10 Id .Jt 5:-:3. :!40 )\;.l:.:!d at :-;6:!. 293 �. Y.S,2d at :-;99. 
II. 5 N Y,:!d 75. 154 �,l:.2d 534. 1:-;0 �. Y.5.2d 265 (195::». 
12 RI" \'. Cit) of �.Y .. 'lIpr" nott: 9. at 5�3. 240 N.E.2d at �61. 293 )\;.y'.S.2d at �99. 
13. Id. at 5))4. 240 N .E.2d at 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 900. 
14 1£1 ..l1590-92. 240 :-':,I:.::!d at S66-67. 293 :\.Y.S.2d at 905-06. 
15. Id, al 5:>3. ::!40 )\;.1" 2d at �61. 293 ;-.;. Y.S.2d at �99. 
It., I" ..It 590. 240 �.E.::!d at :-:66. 293 )\;.Y.S.2d at 905. 
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and fairness and not on the fictions or relics of the doctrine of 'sovereign immunity'. 
Before reaching such question, however, we must resolve the fundamental issue raised 
here and recognize that, having undertaken to provide professional police and fire 
protection, municipalities cannot escape liabilities for damages caused by their failure to 
do  even a minimally adequate job of it.17 
Even if Riss had been decided as Judge Keating wished, Wassersteill v. 
Statel8 might well be a case in which liability would be denied. Plaintiff was 
shot by a sixteen year old parolee and attempted to recover from the state, 
clai m i ng negligent parole supervision i n  the fai lure of the parole officer 
expeditiously to terminate the parole and place the violator in custody. Unlike 
the Riss case, a new factor was introduced in this case. As the court noted: 
In the present case the propriety of admitting the delinquent to parole was established 
and to find that liability to the general public would flow from a failure to revoke a 
parole immediately upon hearing of a technical violation would thwart the purpose of 
attempting rehabilitation through parole. 'Duty', whether its performance be by an 
individual or the State, is concerned with a concept of reasonableness. A parole officer 
acting as a reasonable man is not required to guess or surmise that a 16-year-old boy, 
declared delinquent because of truancy and absence from home, will shoot a pedestrian 
walking along a public street." 
From the perspective of the state, apparently its liability is even further 
constricted. I n  Foster v. State?' the state argued that it should not be held 
responsible for the forceable assault and rape of a fourteen year old inmate 
of a New York training school by a supervisor of that institution. The Court 
o f  C la ims  disagreed.  Judge Glavin noted that "were this court to hold 
otherwise, this decision would be a license to all State employees assigned to 
custodial positions to pillage and plunder, and engage in licentious conduct 
with whomsoever they were charged to protect."!1 
The state was also held liable for the failure of New York State Thruway 
authorities either to provide police escort, to close the Thruway, or to take 
other dramatic measures when a portion of the Thruway was reduced to zero 
visibility as a result of smog.22 A Thruway with zero visibility is extremely 
hazardous to adult drivers so it should be closed or police protection provided. 
On the other hand,  a park fre quented by young children with a slide 
thoroughly slickened by a 1 7-hour rainfall and surrounded by a slick cement 
floor is an insufficient hazard to the youngsters to require either the closing 
of the slide or its supervision by a park superintendent. Consequently, the 
appellate division in Saracil/o v. City oj Sell' York.2:1 held that the trial court 
did properly dismiss plaintiffs complaint. 
17. /d. at 592-93, 24 0 N.E.2d at 867, 293 N.  Y.S.2d at 907-08. 
1 8. 32 App. Div. 2d 1 19, 300 N. Y.S.2d 263 (3d Dep't 1969). 
19. Mat 1 2 1 , 300 N.Y.S.2d at 265. 
20. 57 Misc. 2d 28 1 ,  292 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Ct. CI. 1968). 
2 1 .  [d. at 284, 292 N. Y.S.2d at 272. 
22. Harvey v. N.Y.  State Thruway Authority. 59 Misc. 2d 1079. 301 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Ct. CI. 
1968); Rindfleisch v. State. 59 Misc. 2d \074 . 30 1 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Ct. CI. 1968). 
23. 30 App. Div. 2d 853. 293 N .Y.S.2d 29 (2d Dep't 1968). a/i'd. 23 N .Y.2d 938, 246 
N .E.2d 364. 298 N .y.s.2d 5 1 6  ( 1 969) (mem.). 
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TORT LAW AND THERAPY 
Cases this year again raise the question of  the extent o f  the state's 
responsibility for self-injury and injury to others caused by mental patients 
hospitalized in state facilities. I n  Weglar= v. Stall!,2� the appellate division 
affirmed a judgment o f  the  Court o f  Claims denying state liability for 
im proper supervision, care and surveillance of a decedent who, after some 
treatment, was placed in an open ward from which he disappeared and was 
later found dead of asphyxia due to hanging. The court noted: 
Th�r.: was no showing of prior suicidal tendencies on the part of the decedent and the 
d.:cision of the supervising psychiatrist 'to give him an honor card was based on the 
improvement of the patient; the fact that he was well' and was not negligently made. 
Th� d�cision to place the patient in open ward was a medical judgment. Liability on the 
p.trt of tht: state does not arise if such judgment was, in fact, erroneous. There was no 
furth.:r t:vidence that the hospital authorities had any reason to anticipate that the 
deced.:nt would commit suicideP 
I n  Timmills v. Stare,26 the Court of Claims dismissed a complaint by the 
administrator of a deceased three year old girl whose father killed her on a 
home visit from a mental hospital. I n  part the decision was grounded on the 
fact that the patient had been released in the custody of his brother without 
anticipation that he would visit with his child. More significantly, the court 
noted: "Home visits and passes were authorized by physicians in both 
hospitals, and were in accordance with accepted standards of medical practice. 
The modern concept of handling mental illness is one of  treatment, not 
incarceration. The objective is to return the patient to society which should 
be done as soon as in the judg ment of properly qual ified doctors and 
psychiatrists, it is safe for others and helpful to the patient."2i 
I n both cases, the courts, by their decisions, underscored the important 
policy objective of providing t he maximum possible freedom to persons 
involuntarily hospitalized. \Vhile one can sympathize with the loss occasioned, 
a contrary result would u nderwrite a public safety policing function that 
psychiatrists are ill-equipped to perform and which would lead to broad 
preventive detention responsibilities violative of the civil liberties of mental 
patients.2s 
On the other hand, the interest of providing maximum possible freedom 
to mental patients does not justify the state in failing to provide necessary 
requested service to a patient in convalescent care. Thus, where the failure to 
provide adequate supply of a necessary psychiatric medication (Prokedazine) 
resu lted in a relapse causing injury to others,  the state was held liable in 
,\hC ord v. State .2� 
24. 3 1  A.D.  2d 595. 295 N. Y.S.2d 1 52 (3d Dep't 1968). 
25. !d. at 596. 295 N. Y.S.2d at 1 54-55. 
26. 58 Misc. 2d 626. 296 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Ct. Cl. 1968). 
27. [d. at 63 1 .  296 N. Y.S.2d at 434. 
28. Sit,· gt'nerally T. SZASZ. PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE ( 1 965). 
29. Case remains unreported. Claim Nos. 43405-07. New York Court of Claims. 
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I n  Wright v. State,30 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, 
appeared to em bark on a new and extremely interesting theory. A claim was 
brought for the injuries suffered by a mental patient who jumped from the 
second story window of the Syracuse Psychiatric Hospital during a period of 
confinement. The Court of Claims dismissed plaintiffs action because he did 
not demonstrate, by expert medical testimony, that the supervision provided 
was inadequate. The appellate division unanimously disagreed, stating: 
Expert medical testimony was not required to establish the State's l iability in negligence 
The average trier of the facts should be able to discern the facts as presented and 
determine whether the foreseeable risks to plaintiffs safety, in light of the history of hi' 
suicide attempts and bizzare behavior bet\\een February 7 and 1 3  did not put the ho'pital 
staff on notice to take every reasonable caution to prevent him from harming him�df.)J 
I n  short, the court asserted that whether the state had appropriately fulfilkd 
its function was not a question of medical expertise but of ordinary negligence. 
The decision see ms extremely sound. The court recognized that the 
function which the state was performing by hospitalization of the patient wa, 
essentially custodial. They had incarcerated the patient because of the danger 
of self-injury and had failed as adequate custodians because they did not 
provide the restraint which theoretically justified the initial hospitalization. 
The distinction is crucial. A number of commentators have noted that 
questions of involuntary hospitalization ought not to be treated as medical 
questions.=:2 I n  terms of analyzing the legal relationships of the parties. it ha .. 
been urged that viewing the problem in nonmedical terms leads to far more 
appropriate legal results.:I:1 By refusing to distinguish this case from other case .. 
in which the state undertook to safeguard the safety of a person in its cu .. tl)dial 
care, the court moved in the direction of destroying the immunity imposed b) 
the euphemistic labeling of the problem as "medical." In fact, thl: justification 
for involuntary incarceration is and must be the state's desire to protect eitih:r 
society or the patient. When so viewed, the function is seen as quite similar 
to the function of the restraints imposed in the criminal process. Unlike 
voluntary medical treatment, the state can not be viewed as acting in the 
patient's stated self-interest. I n assuming involuntary hospitalization fu nction, 
it has es tablis hed institutions whose legitimacy turns not only on their 
provision of medical services but also on their application of appropriate 
restraint. Consequently. they can be judged in one of these activities a� can 
other institutions which involuntarily restrain inmates without an inquiry into 
medical practice. 
A combination of the policy of cases minimizing the state's responsibility 
30. 31 App. Div. 1d 41 1 , 300 N .Y.S.1d 153  (4th Dep't 1969). 
3 1 .  Id. at 411, 300 N. Y.S.1d at 1 54. 
31. See. e.g .. T. Sv.sz. I\IYTH m ;\I�" TAL ILL ,,�s� ( 1 966). 
33. See. e.g .. Ale:.ander .I: Szasz. ,HellIal Illness as al/ E,ell.'e lur Cil'il Wroll�'. 43 \';lIrl<.l 
DA \I� L. 14 ( 1 967). 
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for tht: rdease of patients from involuntary hospital restraint. and this case 
charging a hospital with the results of the failure of restraint when a patient 
h a �  not been released. should militate toward a decrease in involuntary 
psychiatric detention. While Wright can hardly be viewed as a bugle blast 
which wilJ cause the wa1ls of psychiatric detention to crumble, it is certainly 
a ca"e demonstrating a rare perception of the problem. I t  wi1l. hopefu1ly. be 
broadly folJowed. 
Even if there were n ot other reasons  for wishing to see the end of  
involuntary institutionalization or persons held to be mentalJy ill. the brutality 
that appears in a number of  reported cases concerning patients would provide 
� trong m otivation.  The Wh itrt:'f! case reported in the 1968 Su rvey:ll was 
subsequently reversed by the appe1late division."; This year a patient brought 
suit for a fractured jaw received when he was struck in the face by an 
attendant because of abusive comments made.:I'; The patient was at the time 
in the cust ody of th ree attendants in a n  elevator  and  his ha nds were 
handcuffed behind his back. Despite the evidence establishing these facts. the 
state attempted to avoid liability by claiming that it was not responsible for 
the act of its attendants. The Court of Claims, rortunately. disagreed. It said: 
I mpkmcntation of tho: doctrine of reasonable care requires the hospital authorities to 
'cket and instruct the staff and to include as part of their training the awareness that 
Ih<: pali�nts ar� not normal. and that their menIal abberations must be coped with in an 
<:nIighl<.:n<:d and sympath..,tic m,mner. so as to avoid crud and heartless punishment thaI. 
through ignor,mc<.:. pr<:vailed generations ago. This rules out as a disciplinary measure 
,my phy,ical .I,sault by ath:ndants. ro:gardless of the verbal provocation." 
St:\'eral cast.:s this year sharpened the legal standard ror judging informed 
consent of patients to medical treatment.  Darrah \" Kitf!.:!' a malpractice 
action against a neurosurgeon who performed a ventriculogram on a nine year 
old boy. was premised in substantial part on the failure to obtain informed 
con .. ent to the operation. Since general consent to perform an operation was 
obtaint:d. the t rial court viewed the case as one requiring plaintiff t o  
demonstrate malpractice. Specifica1ly. with respect to  any facts not disclosed. 
the trial judge instructed the jury that plaintiff was required to demonstrate 
that injuries or disabilities that the plaintiff received must be causalJy lirrked 
to the fa i lure of defendant  t o  disclose addit ional facts .:w The AppelJate 
Division. Third Department. disagreed. stating: 
It has long b�en sdtled in this State that a 'surgeon who performs an operation without 
J.J. See Ale\ander. Torrs. 1968 Surrey oj .\'ell' }'orA La 11'. 20 SYR.KLSE L. R�\' . .J2.J. al 
.J1C: ( 1 969); ,\t'" alw Ale\ander. Torrs. 1967 Sun", .. oj .\'ell' }'orA Lall'. 19 S\RACLS� L. RI'\', 
.J57 • .Jto7·toC: ( 1 968). 
35 Whltr!!c v, Slate. 56 r-.lisc, 1d 693. 290 N. Y.S.2d .J86 (Ct. CI. 1968). 
3&. &nn<:tt \'. State. 59 Misc. 2d 306. 299 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Ct. CI. 1969). 
37. Id at 309. 199 N. Y.S.1d at 291. 
38, 31 App, Di\'. 1d 108. 301 N. Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dep't 1969). 
39. !d. at 1 10. 301 N.Y.S.2d at 290. 
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his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages' . . .  at least 
in the absence of an emergency . . . .  An uninformed or invalid consent is tantamount 
to no consent at all . . . .  An operation performed without an informed consent has been 
characterized as an 'unauthorized operation' . . . .  As the trespass on the body arises 
from the unlawful touching itself there nec:d be no showing of negligence or malice and 
the plaintiff is entitled to any damages which flow from the unauthorized proc.:dun: 
regardless of the fact that the operation was performed with the utmost of care. The 
damages related to the cause of action for uninformed consent arise not bc:cause the 
procedure was performed unsatisfactorily. but because it was performed at all. ''' 
The cause of action for battery was thus reinstated. 
I:-':TE:-':TIO:-':AL TORTS 
A number of prominent persons were in court this year litigating either 
a right to suppress publicatiqns or a right to be compensated for the publicity. 
Howard Hughes was still pressing his suit against Random House to prevent 
the publication of a biography about him.H An earlier case on the same issues 
is com mented on in the 1967 Survey article on torts.H On learning that a 
bi ography was being prepared about him. Mr. H ughes assigned exclusive 
rights in his biography to the plaintiff corporation, a company organized by 
close associates of his. While plaintiff claimed that it intended ultimately to 
publish its own work. the court was pursuaded that its intention was instead 
to suppress any projected biography. In the instant litigation. plaintiff sought 
to establ ish t h at R an dom H ouse's p ublication would violate plai ntiff's 
commercial rights and Mr. Hughes' right of privacy. The court disagreed. I t  
found that in  ;\;ew York a public figure has no right to suppress a biography. 
and lhat the publication of such a biography is constitutionally protected. It  
rejected plaintiffs contention that defendant's biography was materially false 
i n  major respects but stated that even  had there been de monst rable 
falsification in the preparat ion of the book. that would only go to the factual 
question of whether defendant published the book with knowledge of its falsity 
or i n  reckless disregard of its truthY Unless it were thus knowingly or 
recklessly published it would be protected by the first amendment.1I nor could 
a di fferent result be reached. said the court. by characterizing the cause of 
act ion as one for the right of publicity rather than the right of privacy.I' The 
same limitations which are constitutionally imposed on the right of prhac) 
40. Id. at 2 1 0- 1 1 .  301 N . Y.S.2d at 290-9 1 .  
4 1 .  Rosemont Enlt:rprises. Inc. v. Random House. Inc .• 5S Misc. :!d 1 .  294 ', Y-S.:!d I :!:! 
(Sup. Ct.. N .  Y. Co. 1968). 
42. Alexander. Torl,l. 1967 SlIrl'l!), of ,\ el\' } 'or/. Lall'. 19 S, RACL �I L. RI \ 457. 46J II 9bS) 
43. Rosemont Enterprises. Inc. v. Random House. Inc .. Hlpra note 4 1 .  at 5. 294 �,y.s.2d 
at 1 27. 
44. Time. Inc. v. Hill. 385 U.S. 374 ( 1 967). 
45. Rosemont Enterprises. Inc. v. Random House. Inc .• supra note 4 1 . at 6. :!94 N.Y.S.2d 
at 1 29. 
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inhere in the right of pUblicity. Being a newsworthy figure. Howard Hughe� 
was held to be the appropriate subject of an unauthorized biography. 
For similar reasons Ernest Hemingway's widow could not use the right 
of privacy to bar publication of a book about her late husband despite the 
fact that her privacy was also involved.16 Both by being the spouse of so 
renowned a literary figure and by herself having an established reputation as 
a writer. her claim in this respect faced the same obstacles which applied to 
Mr. Hughes. The Hemingway case added a new dimension to the problem, 
however. A good deal of the book about the late author was taken from 
private conversations between Hemingway and the book's author. The case 
thus posed the more difficult question of whether the indisputable right to 
publish biographies of newsworthy figures irrespective of their consent reaches 
their private conversations as well as their public statements. The Court would 
not commit itself. 
Copyright. both common-law and statutory. rests on the assumption that there are forms 
or expre:ssion. limited in kind. to be sure. which should not be: divulged to the public 
w ithout t he consent of their author. The purpose. far from being restrictive. is to 
t!ncourage and protect intellectual labor .... The essential thrust of the First 
Amendment is to prohibit improper restraint on the voluntary public expression of ideas; 
it shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There 
is necessarily. and within suitably defined areas. a concomitant freedom not to speak 
publicly. one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative 
aspect. 
Tht: rule of common-law copyright assures this freedom in the case of written 
material. However. speech is now easily captured by electronic devices and. consequently. 
we should be wary about excluding all possibility of protecting a speaker's right to decide 
when his words. uttered in private dialogue. may or may not be published at large. . . . 
Concerning such problems. we express no opinion; we do no more than raise the 
questions. leaving them open for future consideration in cases which may present them 
more sharply than this one does.17 
The Court then resolved the case by finding that Hemingway had consented 
during his lifet ime t o  the  author's p ublication o f  the conversations in 
question.l� 
Thus, biographies concerning the public aspects of the life of a public 
figure are not governed by the right of privacy. This is true though they are 
published for purposes of trade within the meaning of Civil Rights Law 
Sections 50 and 5 1 .1� Does a patent advertising use of a person's pu blic 
expressions share a similar immunity? A case was raised this year in Ral/d I'. 
Hasch Corp.:''' Ayn Rand complained that the use of her name in promoting 
-16. Hemingway v. Random House. 23 N. Y.2d 34 1 .  244 N. E.2d 250. 296 KY.S.2d 711 
( 1968): for an earlier discussion of the case set! Alexander. Torts. 1968 Sliney 0/ .\ t!\\' } 'orl. Lall" 
20 S\ R.\ClSE L. REV -124. at 462 ( 1 969). 
47. /d. at 348. 2-1-1 N .E.2d at 255. 296 N. Y.S.2d at 718. 
-18. [d. at 3-18--19. 2-1-1 N.E.2d at 255-56. 296 N. Y.S.2d at 718-79. 
-19, N,Y. Cr\'. RIGHTS L.\\\, �§ 50. 5 1  ( l\fcKinney 1948) .  
50. Rand v ,  Hearst Corp . •  3 1  App. Div. 2d -106. 298 N.  Y.S.2d 405 ( 1 st Dep't 1969). 
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the sale of defendant's book violated her right of privacy. Taking a POrtillfi 
of a book review of defendant's book. the defendant published an excerpt from 
the review on the cover or that book. The excerpt read: "Ayn Rand l:njo. h 
. . .  The Same Kind of Mystique A nalysis As Vale . . . .  Their Underlying 
Drive Is The Same. "".;1 While admitting that the book revie\\ publbhed in a 
newspaper was privileged com mentary on public writing. A) n Rand 
complained that the use made of it was patently advertising use in violation 
or the Civil Rights Law. The court disagreed. saying that the statute l11u-;t he 
construed narrowly so as not to curtail 
[Ilree speech. or free press. or to shut off the publication of matters ne\\,\\ orthy or 01 
public interest. or to prevent comment on matters in n hich the pubhc has an int<:rc'! or 
the right to be informed. I ts underlying purpose being to protect privacy. In the ca,e of 
a public figure who by the very nature of being a public figure has no comple!..: 
privacy no liability exists when his or her name or picture is used nithout con,ent. or 
when the article complained of is of public interest. unless. of course. the pubhcatlon " 
knowingly false . . . or may be considered a blatent [sic] 'selfish. commercial 
exploitation' of the individual"s personality." 
The dissent disagreed. holding the test to be whether the nature of the material 
is historical (i.e., factual) news. or the like, or not:·1 If the material is neither 
factual nor historical, privacy pertains. 
I f  the majorit)"s position is upheld. it will have gone a long \\ay to\\ard 
elimiI1ating from the law the often difficult problem of sorting out the puhlic 
interest aspects and the commercial interest in a given publication. Quite 
commonly, they coexist and are hard to separate. The majority would focu� 
on the desirability of the expression concerning prominent figures and their 
viewpoints without regard to the profit motive of those who would pUblbh the 
views. Such a test, replacing the more difficult standard of prior New York 
cases, would seem very much in accord with the developing first amendment 
principles announced by the Supreme CourtY 
The exception to right to privacy action for comments on public figures 
has been so broadened that this year it blocked an action by an entertainer 
against commercial sale of his picture on a poster. ;;'; As part of a te\c\'ision 
show, Mr. Paulsen announced his candidacy for the presidency in 1965 under 
the banner of the Stag Party. He built on this theme throughout his comedy 
appeara nces and  became the subject of considerable commentary. The 
defendants published and sold a "ca mpaign poster"" featuring his picture. 
Despite the fact that the court did not appear seriously to doubt Mr. Paulscn'� 
5 1 .  Id. at 407. 298 N . Y.S.2d at 408. 
52.ld. at 409. 298 N . Y.S.2d at 4 1 0. 
53. Id. at 414. 298 N. Y.S.2d at 4 14. 
54. SI!I! gl!l1era/�\' Alexander. Toris. 1968 Surrey oj ,\I!l\'  Lml'. 20 SYR\Cl�1 L. RI \ 
424. at 457-63 (1969). 
55. Paulsen v. Personality Posters. Inc .. 59 Misc. 2d 444. 299 N .Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct .• �.Y. 
Co. 1968). 
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as�ertion that he was only  kidding,  it was u nwilling t o  classify h is 
"candidacy" as sufficiently different from serious political endeavors. Since 
he had chosen to enter a traditional area of public interest, albeit satiricaIly, 
l\lr. Paulsen became in the court's view as much subject to public exposure 
a� the others;'" 
I f correct, the case would nonetheless appear to be of limited application. 
Sun:!y m ost s ales o f  a picture o f  a public entertainer would entitle the 
entatainer to compensation. I t  would, in fact, have been fairly easy for the 
court to nnd that. since the candidacy was initiated in jest and the posters were 
di-;t ributed in the probable anticipation that they \\ere to be purchased for 
thdr amu�t:ment value rather than because of political interest, the case was 
di'otingu�habh.: from the great bulk of privacy cases where the unauthorized use 
of the person's pictun: would lead to liability. The case does provide one 
'oignificant advantage to future courts if it is foIlowed. Courts wiII not be 
required in these hectic political times to decide which candidates should be 
taken seriously. 
Another right of privacy action was brought on behalf of an infant who 
had been posed with a model wearing a new bathing suit in a picture which 
ultimatdy appt:ared in the Herald Tribune magazine.:" Although the picture 
appean:d in a feature section and not as an advertisement, its caption did 
indicate that tht: type of bathing suit featured was available for $20.00. at 
Lord and Taylor. Thus ,  cla imed plaint iffs , his picture was used "for 
advt:rtbing purposes." The court disagreed. primarily because it found the 
Il:ature story far n:mon:d from actual advertising copy.:'s Nor was it persuaded 
that the posing of the scene created the kind of fictionalized account on which 
liability might be premised. finding. in that respect, fa lsity or reckless 
di�rt:gard of truth to be necessary criteria because of Time. fllc. v. H iIl.:'�' I t  
\\a-. a dosc decision, with two of the five justices dissenting. In  their opinion 
tht:rc was an issue to be litigated as to whether this feature was really an 
"advcrtist:ment in disguise,""" The majority's refusal to allow that issue to be 
litigated is yet another example of the broad reading that has been given to 
the fret: c\prt:ssion guarantees so recently announced to be applicable to this 
area by the United States Supreme Court. 
Similarly , in the area of libel the constitutional immunity granted by Sew 
}'urf. Timl" I'. Sullil'all',J continued t o  make in roads into t raditional 
dtfa mation actions. Members of a garbage disposal association accused of 
ha\ing contacts with the Mafia \\ere su fl1ciently in the public limelight to 
:ib Id.lt -l-l'). 29') :-. Y.S 2d.lt 507-0::. 
57 P;lg,m \' '>;�\\ York Hcr;lld Tnbun�. Inc .• 32 App. Div. 2d 3-l1. 301 N.Y.S.1d 110 (1st 
lJ,p'\ I <)h')) 
5:\ 1<1 ,It J.t3. 301 \;.Y.S.2d   123. 
5'1. Id ;It 3.t.t, 3UI '>;.Y.S.2d.lt 12-l. 
60. '" at 3-l.t, 301 '>;. Y.S.2d at 12-l (diss�nting opinion). 
61 .n611S 25.t(196.t). 
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invoke the rule.62 After carefully reviewing the precedent, the court concluded 
that a sanitation department which performed the collection functions for 
several cit ies and towns was infected with a public interest and that. in 
consequence, the public's concern about possible connections with organized 
crime warranted the same type of robust and free public discussion as was 
supported in the original Times case. Thus. a claim against the defendant 
wh ose s tatements were not demonstrably falsely or recklessly made was 
dismissed. 63 Another cause of action, in the same case. was preserved becaust: 
of evidence of knowing falsity or reckless disregard of truth.6t 
Senator Barry Goldwater was also confronted with the ,Vel\' } 'orA. Time \ 
rule in his libel suit arising out of an article. in Fact magazine entitled "The 
Unconscious of  a Conservative : A Special I ssue  on the Mind of Barry 
Goldwater."65 The article had concluded. among other things. that Gold\\ater 
suffered from paranoia and had demonstrated "infantile fantasies of rewngt: 
and dreams of total annihilation of his adversaries. "6'i It also attributed a 
nervous breakdown to the senator.Si 
The trial court allowed the jury to find actual malice in the publication 
of the article and the Court of Appeals. Second Circuit, affirmed. On the 
whole, the statements made in the article were cited from other sources or 
taken from a poll of psychiatrists which had inquired into Goldwater's mental 
health. To be sure, there was some biased extrapolation. The court did not 
rt:ly on actual errors, however. in reaching its conclusion, but found the failure 
to make a more thorough investigation itself sufficient evidence of malice even 
with respect to items accurately quoted. I t  stated: 
There are many parallels between the evidence tending to prove actual malice In this case 
and the proof in Curtis Publishing Co. l'. Butts, 388 U.S. 1 30. 87 S, Ct. 1975, 18 L. 
Ed. 2d 1094 ( 1967), which the Supreme Court held was sufficient to establish actual 
malice. The Goldwater article did not contain 'hot news'; appellants were very much 
aware of the possible resulting harm; the seriousness of the charges called for .l thorough 
investigation but the evidence reveals only the careless utilization of slipshod and sketchy 
investigative techniques; appellants were not psychiatric experts nor did they have any 
experts review 'Goldwater: The Man and the Menace' or evaluate its conclusion; they 
persisted in their polling project despite warnings by reputable professional organizations 
that their techniques lacked validity; and, obviously there was evidence as to whether 
there was a possible preconceived plan. to attack Senator Goldwater regardless of the 
facts.e. 
This evidence. together with the other facts brought out at trial, established 
that the appellants not only knowingly published defamatory statements but 
62. Arizona Biochemical Co. v. Hearst Corp., 302 F. Supp. 4 1 2 (S.D.N.  Y. 1969). 
63. [d. at 4 13 .  
64 . [d. at 4 1 7. 
65. Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 4 14 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969). 
66. [d. at 33 1 .  
67. [d. 
68. [d. at 339-40. 
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also established with convincing clarity that the appellants were motivated by 
actual malice when they published these defamatory statements.69 The court 
pointed out that defendants did not act in good fa ith in republishing other 
accounts of Senator Goldwater's character?' 
One may wonder whether the Supreme Court intended that, in political 
debates concerning candidates for public oflice, defamation could be used to 
punish statements republished \\ ithout verification partially because of the 
intention of the republisher to have them support this predetermined point of 
view. Certainly his ill will or personal spite would not independently suffice. 
The quotations were after a l l  from reputable sou rces: Pageant, Good 
HOllsekeeping, and Tillie magazines}1 The letters published from psychiatrists 
were presumably written by psychiatrists. One may also wonder whether the 
court was correct in its assertion that the article did not contain "hot news" 
when it was published in the September-October issue preceding the November 
eh:ction.72 I f the case is correct. it would seem to reimpose some restraint on 
the more colorful forms of character assassination which so commonly are 
concomitant with significant elections. 
Also this year the Court of Appeals, over the dissents of Judges Fuld and 
Bergan. upheld the judgment for libel arising out of the mass publication of 
a legal complaint. holding that such publication was not governed by the 
exception to libel for fair and true reports of judicial proceedings}:: 
One of the problems in bringing suits for fraud has been the defense of 
mistatement o f  law. Although mistatements of facts are held actionable. 
historically mistatements of law were not. This year, the Court of Appeals 
took an opportunity to update New York law in this respect. In Salional 
COIll'/!nioJ/ Corp. \" Ce dar Bui lding Corp . . it plaintiffs complained of a 
claimed false representation that the demised premises were situated in an 
u n rest ricted a rea .  Defendants asserted that  such representations were 
representations of law and not actionable, but the Court disagreed. 
[T)ht: hl\\ has outgrown the: over-simple dichotomy between law and fact and the 
n;,olution of issues in deedt. It has been said that 'a statement as to the law. like a 
'tatt:m�nt a, to anything dse. may be intended and understood either as one of fact or 
on� 01 opinIOn only. according to the circumstances of the case: The statement in this 
':.bt:. both b.:lore the execution of tht: least:. and in the body of the lease. exemplify ideally 
.tn i n,tanee: in \\ hich tht: statt:mt:nts art: not intt:nded or understood mt:reIy as an 
"pr':"lOn 01 opinion. Landlords said tht:y knew thO! premist:s were in an unrestricted 
69. Id 
70. Id. at 337. 
7 1 .  Id. at 329-30. 
n. Id, at 339 .  
73. WiIIianh v. Williams. 23 �.Y.2d 592. 246 N .E.2d 333, 298 N . Y.S.2d 473 ( 1969). For a 
discus,ion 01 the cas.: in the appellate: division set! Alexander, Torts. 1968 Surwy of New York 
L<I'I'. 20 S, R \Cl �l L R� v. 424. at 470 (1969).  
R 23 N . Y.2d 62 1 .  246 N.E.2d 35 1 .  298 N . Y.S.2d 499 ( 1969). 
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district. This meant that they knew as a fact that the zoning resolution did not rc,tncl 
the use of the particular premises, and tenant so understood it." 
So holding, the Court affirmed the appellate division judgment for plaintiff.,!" 
CO\t:\IERCIAL TORTS 
When a person's employment contract is breached, he has a cause of 
action against his employer. If others have induced the breach knowingl) , he 
may also have a cause of action against them for the tort of interference with 
his contractual relations. This year the Court of Appeals considered the rardy 
litigated question of privilege to interfere with contracts and held in Fd�t'l/ 1'. 
Sol Cafe Mfg. Corp.;; that a person with a financial interest in the operation 
of the business had a privilege to induce termination of a contract ab�ent 
express malice. Thus, while affirming a recovery for a discharged emplo)ee 
on a contractual basis,  it reversed a jury determination of inducement to 
breach by the sole stockholder in a parent corporation, finding that as a 
matter of law he had the requisite financial interest in the operation of the 
employer's business which would justify his intervention. 
Breach of contract was also an issue in North Shore Bottli llg Co. \'. C. 
Schmidt & Sons. In c.7s Plaintiff had obtained a n  exclusive wholesale 
distributors hip for as  long as defendant sold his beer in the New York 
metropolitan area. Despite this contractual provision, the defendant later 
designated an alternative distributor in place of plaintiff and plaintiff brought 
a cause of action for breach of contract and conspiracy between the defendant 
and others to defraud plaintiff. Affirming the appellate division's vie\\ ,7" the 
Court of Appeals held the charge of conspiracy to breach the agreement to 
be inapplicable as to the defendant on the basis that interference with contract 
is not an available remedy between contracting parties.'" I t ,  nonetheless, 
upheld plaintiffs leave to serve an amended complaint based on the same 
facts.sl Since plaintiff had claimed that defendants had entered the contract 
intending to reassign the distributorship, once plaintiff established the 
business, an action for fraud might well lie. 
The United States Supreme Court broadened the prospects for private 
antitrust suits in Perilla Life Mufflers. Inc. v. International Parts Curp.,'! by 
75. [d. at 627-28, 246 N. E.2d at 355, 298 N. Y.S.2d at 504. 
76. Nat'l Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Building Corp .. 29 App. Div. 2d 983. 290 N. Y S �J 
10 19  (2d Dep't 1968). 
77. 24 N .Y.2d 682, 249 N . E.2d 459, 301 N.Y.S.2d 6 1 0  ( 1969). 
78. 22 N .Y.2d 1 7 1 , 239 N .E.2d 1 89,292 N. Y.S.2d 86 ( 1968). 
79. North Shore Bottling Co. v.  C. Schmidt and Sons. Inc .. 28 App. Di\,. 2d 5b9. �so 
N .Y.S.2d 427 (2d Dep't 1967). 
80. North Shore Bottling Co. v. C. Schmidt and Sons, Inc .• supra note 78. at 179. 23'1 
N .E.2d at 1 93, 292 N. Y.S.2d at 92. 
8 1 .  Id. 
82. 392 U.S. 1 34 ( 1968). 
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holding that the in pari delicto defense had no application to antitrust suits 
and that those involved in illegal schemes could. in the interest of vindicating 
broader antitrust objectives. bring suits. At the same time the issue of whether 
antitrust violation may be used itself as a defense to other forms of litigation 
was raised by several New York cases. I n Carl Zeiss Stijt ung v. V. E. B. Carl 
Zd.'·s, Jt:'na,-'! defendant attempted to defend a trademark infringement action 
by demonstrating that the trademarked product had been used in various ways 
to violate the antitrust laws of the United States. The court, analyzing Section 
33(b)(7) of the Lanham Act,'l which denies conclusive evidentiary force to the 
registration of a t rademark that has been or is being used to violate the 
antitrust laws, held that the provision was intended only to deny the statutory 
bendit to antitrust violators and not to deny the validity of the trademark. I t  
then turned t o  the question of whether, in the exercise o f  its equity jurisdiction. 
the court  should cons ider the a ntitrust violation as a rea son t o  deny 
enforcement of the trademark rights. a practice common in patent cases.�:; In  
concluding that it should not, the court reasoned that the product's reputation 
might well have been essential to the antitrust violation but that the trademark 
itself was not .  I t  feared that failing to distinguish between a product's 
reputation and the trademarks used would make trademark forfeiture an 
aut omatic concomitant to any antitrust violation and thus frustrate the 
asrects of trademark protection designed to serve consumers through product 
identification."; 
I n  T,YT ComlJlunic ations, Inc. v. Management Television Systems, 
/lIe .. " an antitrust defense was set up by former employees being sued by their 
fo rmt:r em ployer t o  rest rain their disclosure o f  trade secrets.  Their 
counterclaim asserted that plaintiff was attempting to obtain a prominent 
po�ition in his business in violation of state and federal antitrust laws. The 
court noted that the relationship between the asserted monopolistic position 
of the plaintiff and the possible misuse of his trade secrets was quite remote 
and. on that basis. refused to consider the antitrust defense. 
Both cases seem to support the United States Supreme Court's direction 
in thi� area. While encouraging antit rust litigation by those who have an 
intere'it in bringing suits." the Court has also indicated that it considers it 
inappropriate to use antitrust issues. tangential to  other transactions. as a bar 
to litigating those transactions.'� 
:-:3. 290: F. Supp. 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
:-.<4. 15 U.S,C. §§ 1 115(6). (7) ( 1964). 
:->5 . .  See. t' g • :\Iorton Salt Co. \'. G.s. Suppigt:r Co .. 314 U.S. 488 ( 1942). 
:->0 Carl Zd" Stiftung \'. V.E. B. Carl Zeiss. J�na, supra note 83. at IJ 15-16. 
:-:7. 32 App. Dn', 2d 55. 299 N. y.s.2d 692 ( 1st Dep't 1969). 
xx, \cc, <" g .. Pcrma Lit\: :\Iuftlers. Inc. v. International Parts Corp .• supra note 82. 
:-;9, Kelly \' Kosuga. 35:: U.s. 5 16 ( 1959). 
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UNI:-ITE:-;TIO:-lAL TORTS 
This year the Court of Appeals grappled with some fairly fundamental 
questions in the law of negligence. I n  Gelblllan v. Gelblllan.�11 the Court 
reviewed the historic position of the state on intrafamilial tort suits. Since the 
immunity from suit in intrafamilial torts is thought to have a serious effect 
on family relations, the Court of Appeals in Badigian v. Badigiall�1 previously 
declined to change the common-law rule without legislative guidance. This 
year it noted that seven years had passed since that decision and legislative 
guidance had not been forthcoming.92 I t  noted that intrafamilial immunity was 
a court-created rule and that courts could revoke it. After revie .. ing the stated 
rationale for immunity, maintaining family harmony, the Court rejected it 
fairly forcefuIIy.93 Not only does intrafamilial tort immunity no longer apply 
for non willful  torts, but the rule is expressly made retrospective to matters 
which have not gone to final judgment.9� The decision was unanimous. 
In Endresz v. Friedberg,9:; the Court considered whether a wrongful death 
action would lie for the negligent killing of a fetus, and held it would not. 
A fter weighing the policy considerations for and against such recovery. the 
Co urt decided that the most practical solution was to continue to allow 
parents to  recover for damages directly inflicted on them. The Court was 
careful to point out that it arrived at this conclusion not by giving mindless 
defe rence t o  precedent, but by careful consideration of the necessity for 
additional actions in such cases. I t  believed that the parent's recovery sufficed. 
Judges Burke and Keating dissented. 
The Court also affirmed the result in Tobin v. GrossIIlan,96 commented 
on in last year's Survey.9i I t  thus prohibited recovery for infliction of mental 
distress arising out of direct harm to others irrespective of relationship to the 
harmed pers o n  and t he witnessing of the event.  The Court took the 
opportunity of this decision to articulate again what it feels its role is in the 
development of tort law. 
I n recent years this court has expanded many tort concepts. but they have been only 
expansions rather than significant creation of entirely new causes of action. Thus. in the 
Battalla and Ferrara cases (supra). the realitj of ps)chological causation with consequent 
mental and physical harms was recognized in an area \\ hen: previously even the slightest 
physical impact would have been suflicient to establish a cause of action. Although in 
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co. (22 N.Y.2d 49 8) it was necessary to strike down 
90. 23 N .Y.2d 434. 245 N .E.2d 192. 29 7 N.Y.S.2d 529 ( 1969). 
9 1 .  9 N.Y.2d 472. 1 74 ·N.E.2d 7 1 8. 215 N .Y.S.2d 35 ( 196 1 ). 
92. Gelbman v. Gelbman. supra note 90. at 4 37. 24 5 N .E.2d at 193. 197 N .y.s.2d at 530. 
93. [d. at 4 37-38. 245 N .E.2d at 193. 297 N .Y.S.2d at 530-3 \ .  
94 . [d. at 439. 245 N .E.2d at 194, 297 N .  Y.S.2d at 532. 
95. 24 N.Y.2d 478, 24 8 N . E.2d 901 ,  30 1 N .Y.S.1d 65 ( 1969). 
96. 24 N .Y.2d 609 , 249 N .E.1d 4 19. 30 1 N. Y.S.1d 554 ( 1969). 
97.  Alexander, Torts. 1968 Sun'ey of ,Vew York Law, 20 SYR>,CLSE L. REV.  424. at 433 
(1969). 
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..t bar to a wife's recovery for loss of consortium, the fact of such harm was always 
evident and recovery had always been allowed to the husband in the converse situation. 
Although in Gdbmall I'. Gelbmall (23 N.Y.2d 434) the immunity from suit between 
parent and child for non intentional tort was abandoned, there was no such intrafamilial 
immunity for intentional tort, and precisely the same conduct between others would give 
rise to a cause of action. . . . 
Similarly. Woods 1'. Lallcet (302 N.Y. 349) involved well-understood harms but for 
which r.:co\'ery had theretofore been barred only because of difficulties in recognizing the 
personality as entitled to sue. In that case plaintiff was permitted to recover for injuries 
,ustained while a fetus ill utero resulting from impact on the mother. Plaintiff, who had 
been the direct object of the harm inflicted. would have had a cause of action, except 
for the conceptual difticulty of not having been the legal person with capacity to sue at 
the time the wrong was committed. 
On the other hand. the Court was unanimous in denying the cause of action for an 
alleged \\ fong which the law has never before recognized as a wrong at all ( Williams 1'. 
Sta1t� of N .. II' l 'ork. 18 N.Y.2d 48 1 .  483). The Williams case involved an action by an 
IIlegitimat.: child conceived in a State mental hospital of a mentally deficient mother who 
\\ as not prot<!cted from sexual attack. Damages were sought for a 'wrongful life: The 
Court. in discussing its recent expansion of tort concepts observed: 'In none of these were 
\\c asked to. nor did we. go so far as to invent a brand new ground for suit' (p. 483). 
Of course, the common law is not circumscribed by syllogisms, however constructed 
out of precedencc. and this case presents an acute issue that will not pass merely by the' 
incantation of a logical formula. 
I f that \\cre not so. the developments in the field of products liability would never 
haw taken place. True. the landmark cases in that area did not acknowledge creation 
of new causes of action or describe new harms as compensable. but they certainly 
broadened the range of duty and. therefore. of liability . . . .  Thus. for all practical 
purposes. in a limited sense. new causes of action were created when' liability was imposed 
on others than the mere purveyors of goods and services." 
To take a thought from the Court, for all practical purposes, in  a limited 
sense, the Court appeared in its review of cases to be indicating that the cate­
gorical denial of the creation of new torts in Williams v. Stat £f'9 was no longer 
to be taken seriously. I n  a number of cases cited its results had made that 
clear. It is good to have this later more careful statement to substitute for the 
Williams language, even though it comes in a case in which new liability is 
categorically rejected. 
I n another case,11I 1I dealing with the effect of a release, the Court of  
Appeals upheld an appellate division ruling which determined that a jury 
should consider the validity of a release signed within fifteen days of the time 
tht' inju ries were received. The release was knowingly and intentionally 
executed while the person was hospitalized, so the burden of proof rested with 
the defendant. Despite the fact that obtaining such a release under such 
ci rcumstances was a violation of Section 270-b of  the then extant Penal 
98. Tobin v. Grossman. supra note 96, at 6 1 3- 1 4, 249 N . E.2d at 42 1 -22, 301 N .Y.S.2d at 
556-58. 
99. 18 N.Y.2d 48 1 .  223 N . E.2d 343, 276 N .Y.S.2d 885 ( 1 966). 
100. Fleming v. Ponziani. 24 N.Y.2d 105, 247 N . E.2d 1 14, 299 N.Y.S.2d 134 (\ 969). 
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Law,lol the Court ruled that the jury could be properly given the qU6tion for 
decision. 
The Court also put to death this year the fairly anomalous prior e;'N'� 
which had barred reliance on res ipsa loquitur when plaintiff int roduced 
specific evidence of negligence. During street rioting in Roche�t..:r. �ew York. 
a civil defense official chartered a helicopter to observe trouble spots. The 
helicopter crashed and the pilot's lvidow sued for wrongful death.I"! 
At trial, the defendants asserted immunity either as a participant in cn il 
defense under the New York St:.lte Defense E mergenc:- -\ct . t ' ' '  or in  
catastrophe control provided for by the General l\lunicipal La\\ . 1" 1  The Court 
disagreed, viewing the charter as wholly commercial and as involving no al.hhi 
risk as a result of the riots, and noted in passing that it \\ a� the policy of thl.' 
state to decrease obstacles to the recovery of damages for negligcnce:"" It then 
turned to defendant's argument that specific acts of negligence had been 
proved, thus making reliance on res ipsa loquitur improper. It noted that prIOr 
New York cases had previously been interpreted b� many as e'tabli�hing t he 
rule that res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked under such circum�tanee .. . The 
Court of Appeals rejected that interpretation as irrational. Hl.'ncdonh one 
may proceed on the theory of negligence based on specific fact-; and nn re� 
ipsa loquitur.1lI6 
The rescue doctrine was applied in several signi ficant cases this yl.'ar. Thl.' 
Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division's failure to aIlo\\ the doctrine 
i n  Pro venzo v. Sam. I II; Plaintiff had gone to the aid of a driver \\ hom he 
assumed to be suffering from a heart attack. The "victim's" car had \wreo 
apparently out of control before it finally hit a parked car acroo;s the �trect. 
struck a house, and stopped. In his attempt to reach the drivl.'r. plaintil f \\a � 
injured when struck by another car. He sued both the driver or the car \\ h l! 
struck him and the driver he sought to aid. It turned out that the other orn er 
had not been ill as he had surmised but was intoxicated. The Court of .\ppeal� 
held that the rescue doctrine applied. While noting that the normal application 
of the rescue doctrine requires three people, the one culpably negligent. the one 
injured by that negligence and the rescuer, it is now acceptably applied a .. \\1.'11 
to two-party situations where the rescued party himself. by his 0\\ n negligl.'nel." 
has created the situation which invites the rescue.t''' Thus victims or their 0\\ n 
negligence may appropriately be sued by those injured in seeking to aid thl.'l11 . 
I O \ .  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 270-b < Penal Law of 1909) (McKinney 1967). 
102. Abbott v .  Page 'Airways, Inc . •  13  N . Y.2d 502, 245 N . E. 2d 3):;):;. 297 " 't .S.2d 7 1 3  
( 1969). 
103. N.Y. UNCONSOLIDATED L .. ws § 9 \ 0 1  el. seq. ( :\lcKinney 196 1 ). 
104. N.Y. GEN. MUN. L .. w § 209-n(a) (McKinney 1965). 
lOS. Abbott v. Page Airways. Inc., supra note 1 02. at 507, 245 N . I:.2d at 39U. 297 '\. Y � 2d 
at 7 1 6. 
106. Id. at 5 1 2- 1 4. 245 N.E.2d at 394-95, 297 N. Y.S.2d at 720-22. 
107. 23 N. Y.2d 256, 244 N. E.2d 26, 296 1" . Y.S.2d 322 ( 1 96::1). dN lI ' \('" //I \lc\J.nd,r. 
Torts, 1968 SUrl'ey o!,vew } 'ork Law, 20 Si R .. Cl,;SE L. REV. 4:!4. at 475 ( \ 969 ) .  
\08. /d. at 260, 244 N.E.2d at  28,  296 N. Y.S.2d at  325. 
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In  line with the Court of Appeals ruling in Rooney v. S . ..1 .  He aly CO. "I)�l 
which held the manufacturer of a gas mask responsible for the death of a 
person wearing the mask. the Appellate Division. Second Department. which 
had originally refused recovery in that case. held the defendants liable as well 
to those injured or killed in their attempt to rescue the decedent .. I II I n  Knudsen 
\' . .  \ ew Dorp Cval Corp.!1 1  the Court of Appeals upheld an appellate d ivision 
judgment which approved another application of the rescue theory. Plaintiffs 
car  had been backed i n to  by  defendant 's  t ruck .  and  the pol ice were 
i n ve�t igat ing at the scene of the accident .  A nt i freeze had leaked from 
plaintiffs radiator because of the impact. Suddenly a child dashed from the 
�ide\\'alk into the street. Pla intiff. attempting to reach the child. slipped on the 
antifreeze. According to both appellate courts the rescue doctrine applied and 
plaintiff could include. as part of a negligence claim. this injury as well. 
A number of cases dealt with collisions caused when cars unexpectedly 
either crossed from a lane going in the other direction or swerved in front of 
other cars.  and the courts absolved the  dr ivers who .  under th ose 
circumstances. crashed into the cars ahead of them,, 12 The Court of Appeals 
stopped short. however. of upholding a contributory negligence finding against 
two employees working on and near a truck parked at right angles to. and 
projecting three feet over the paved portion of, a two-lane highway. One 
employee w as behind the truck with a flashlight waving on traffic and the 
other was unloading dirt from the truck . A red flasher light was on the hood 
or the truck. Although this vehicle was also in a place sufficiently obstructive 
of traffic to al low holding in negligence the person who parked the truck. 
neither of the employees was found to bear legal responsibility for that act . 
TI1U�. it was appropriate for the jury to find that the employees were acting 
with due care in warning oncoming tramc and in working on the truck. The 
A ppellate Division. Fourth Department. reversed a trial judgment for the 
employees against the owner of the truck.1 I :I The Court of Appeals held this 
to be error and ordered a new trial.1 I 1  
I n another case arising out of an automobile accident. the duty of  the 
10'1. �o � .Y.1d 4�. 22:-: � .E.�d 383. 2:-: 1 N .Y.S.2d 32 1 ( 1 967). 
1 1 0. Guarmo \'. �lin.: Saf.:ty Appliances Co .. 31 App. Di\,. 2d 255. 297 N .Y.S.2d 639 (2d 
D<:p't 1'169). As thi> articl.: \Ient to press. GuarillO was aflirmed by the Court of Appeals. _ 
N.Y. 2d _. _  N.E.2d _. _ N.Y.S. 2d _ ( 1 970). 
I l l . 13 � . Y  . .2d :-:9.2. 245 N.E.2d 8 1 7. 298 �. Y.S . .2d 90 ( 1 969). 
1 1 2. P.!lm<:r 1'. PJlmer. 3 1  App. Di\,. 2d 876. 297 N.Y.S.2d 428 (3d Dep't 1969) (re\'ersing 
IIndmg for plaintiff); Whitely I'. Lobue • .24 � .  Y.2d 896. 249 N .E.2d 476. 30 I N. Y.S . .2d 635 ( 1 969) 
(n:in'tating summary judgment for plainti ff); Joyce \'. Stock\\ell. 32 App. Dil'. 2d 698. 299 
N Y.S.1d 10 1 1 (3d Dep't 1969) (r.:\'ersing judgment against driver); Niel'es v. Manhattan & Bronx 
Surface Transit Operating Authority. 3 1  App. Oil'. 2d 359. 297 N .Y.S.2d 743 ( 1 st Dep't 1969) 
(r':I'Cr,ing judgment against bus company and bus driver). 
1 1 3 . Onl at I'. Sm.:tansky. 27 App. Di\,. 2d 640. 275 N .Y.S.2d 493 (4th Dep't 1966). 
1 1 4. Orwat \'. Smetansky. 22 �. Y . .2d 869. 239 N. E.2d 749. 293 N. Y.S.ld 1 26 ( 1 968). 
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state to  assure highway safety was raised in  an interesting fashion}L; The 
driver of a car negligently drove into guardrails adjacent to a highway. The 
state sued to recover for the damage to the guardrails. Defendant defended on 
the basis that the state was required to 'provide the guardrails as part of its 
obl igation for h ighway safety, and that defendant, as a traveler on the 
highway, was part of a class for whose special use and benefit the guardrails 
had been erected. Since, it was reasoned, the guardrails were there for his 
protection and had served their function in preventing further injury. that 
should end the matter. The court disagreed, denying that there was an absolute 
duty to provide guardrails and thus avoiding the main thrust of defendant's 
argument. H owever, it would seem equally sound merely to have concluded 
that the existence of a duty to prevent injury to others does not absolve the 
person benefited of paying the costs that such duty imposes}16 
Labor Law Section 240117 and subsequent sections provide specific safety 
requirements for certain types of work. This year, a number of plaintiffs sued 
for alleged violation of the law. The cases demonstrated that the application 
of the labor law standards to tort litigation is still shrouded in some confusion. 
I n  Sarnoff v. Charles Schad. Illc . . I 1� plaintiff, a painter engaged to paint a 
church, fell from a scaffold more than twenty feet above the ground. The 
scaffold did not have the safety rail required by the statute. Plaintiff sued the 
general contractor and the subcontractor who had furnished the scaffolding. 
The trial court, after jury verdicts holding both defendants responsible. held 
the general contractor and released the company furnishing the scaffolding, 
and the Court of Appeals agreed. While, the Court of Appeals stated, it 
generally would be the subcontractor. for whom the employee worked. rather 
than the general contractor, who would bear the statutory responsibility. 
where, as here, the general contractor had undertaken to furnish the necessary 
scaffolding the responsibility was his}l9 On the other hand. nothing in the 
statute appeared to apply to the i'urnisher of the scaffolding itself since a 
person who neither employs nor directs another in the performance of his 
labor is apparently beyond its sanctionsPO 
Furthermore, one can fail to qualify for the protection of the Labor Law 
because he does not perform precisely the kind of work specified by statute. 
Thus, where plaintiff sued for failure to provide safety equipment that led 
a l legedly to  h is  fa l l ing fro m  a window whi le removing a broken pane 
preparatory to replacing it, he was denied a cause of action under Section 202 
of  the Labor Law, 1 2 1  which is add ressed to  persons engaged in window 
1 1 5 .  State v. Hart, 57 Misc. 2d 296, 292 N.  Y.S.2d 320 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1968 ). 
1 16. See Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co .. 109 Minn. 456. 124 N.W. 22 1 ( 1 9 1 0). 
1 1 7. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 240 ( McKinney 1965). 
1 1 8. 22 N.Y.2d 1 80, 239 N.E.2d 194, 292 N.  Y.S.2d 93 ( \968). 
1 19. Id. at 1 85, 239 N.E.2d at 196, 292 N. Y.S.2d at 97. 
120. Boraski v. Backer, 32 App. Div. 2d 577, 299 N. Y.S.2d 335 (3d Dep't 1969). 
1 2 1 .  N.Y. LABOR LAW § 202 (McKinney 1965). 
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cleaning. Also. though fit ting appropriately the type of  work statutorily 
addressed. plaintiff fa ils i f  his employer is a private home owner merely 
making home repairs. I n  Rivers v. Sauter.122 the court concluded that such a 
result did not 
erode the policy expressed in the Labor Law. The virtual abolition in cases based on the 
Labor Law of the conception of liability based on faul t  is justified where the 
consequential cost of an accident is made a burden of a business. I t  is hardly to be 
conceived that the Legislature without express statement intended to extend the same 
liability to homeowners not similarly engaged. As to the latter, their liability would 
r.:main what it was at common law}23 
I I' o ne h u rd les these threshold problems. he is then confronted with 
interpreting the specifics of the statute. Here, too, he may not be successful 
Section 24 1 -a of the Labor Laww requires that an employer cover an elevator 
shaft not more than one story below men working on it. The decedent was 
working three feet above the thirtieth floor and planking was placed across 
the shaft at the thirtieth floor. There was, however, no planking beneath the 
thirtieth floor. Nonetheless. the appellate division found that the statute was 
adequately complied with by the one floor of planking, and the Court of 
Appeals aft1rmedP-; Furthermore. while there may be an obligation to avoid 
common hazards. details of work performed under the immediate supervision 
of contractors are not governed. Thus. where an I beam tipped as it was being 
placed. hurling an employee to his death. the appellate division reversed a 
recovery and the Court of Appeals affirmedY6 Also, Section 24 1 of the Labor 
Law.  which provides in general ter m s  for t he reasonable and adequate 
protect ion and safety o f  persons e m p loyed or frequenting bui ld ing or  
construct ion work s i tes.l2i u n l i ke specific provisions of the  Labor Law 
re quiring indi cated safety features .  does not  preclude the  defense of 
cont ribut ory negligence.w I n  cases where specific  acts a re req uired, 
contributory negligence is not available.J2�' 
Asidt: from the statutory duties imposed by the Labor Law, a number of 
other duties were litigated. In Roark v. HUll1il1g,l�1I the Court of Appeals had 
before it the question of the duty of a tenant for injury caused by ice on the 
sidewalk abutting his building. It was alleged that the ice had been formed 
1 22.  32 !\pp. Dh'. 2d 59. 299 N .Y.S.2d 934 ( 1 st Dep't (969). 
1 23. Id at 6 1 .  299 N . Y.S.2d at 936. 
124. N Y  L\BOR L\\\' � 24 1-a ( McKinney 1965). 
1 25 .  G�rman \'. Grand Central Building. I nc .. 22 N . Y.2d 82 1 .  239 N . E.2d 655, 292 
N.Y.S.2d 9 1 6  ( 1 968 ). 
1 26. CurtIs v. Stat�. 23 N.Y.2d 976. 246 N .E.2d 75 1 .  298 N.Y.S.2d 99 1 ( 1 969). 
1 27 .  N Y. LABOR L\\\' � 24 1 ( McKinney 1965). 
12S.  Corb�tt v .  Brown. 32 App. Div. 2d 27. 299 N. Y.S.2d 2 1 9  (3d Dep't 1969); Long v. 
G.trtn�r. 32 App. Div. 2d 25. 299 N. Y.S.2d 226 (3d Dep't 1969). 
1 29. Koenig v. Patrick Cons!. Co .. 298 N . Y. 3 1 3. 83 N .E.2d 1 33 ( 1 948); Utica Mutual Ins. 
Co. v. Mancmi .l.; Sons. 9 App. Di\,. 2d 1 1 6. In N .  Y.S.2d 87 (4th Dep't 1959). 
1 30. 24 N. Y.2d 470. 248 N . E.2d 896, 301 N. Y.S.2d 59 ( 1 969). 
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by water dripping from a sign in front of his premises. The Court reviewed 
wi th  approval an appel late div is ion formulation of general liability for 
removal of snow and ice. 
As a general rule it is only the municipality which may be held liable for the negligent 
failure to remove snow and ice from a public sidewalk or to have defects and dangerou� 
conditions in the sidewalk repaired . . .  unless a charter, statute or ordinance clearly 
imposes liability upon the owner in favor of the injured pedestrian . . . .  An abutting 
owner is not liable even though he failed to comply with the provision of a charter, 
statute or ordinance charging him with removal of snow and ice, nor is he liable for thl! 
removal thereof in an incomplete manner . . . .  It is also a general rule that an abutting 
owner is liable if, by artificial means, snow and ice are transferred from the abutting 
premises to the sidewalk; or if, by such artificial means, water from the property is 
permitted to flow into the public sidewalks where it freezes. The basic distinction between 
liability and nonliability rests upon whether the water, snow or ice was conducted from 
private premises to the public sidewalk by artificial or natural means. The abutting owner 
may be held liable in the former case-where the unsafe condition was created by hi, 
own wrongful act . . .  [but] he is not liable in the latter case where he committed no 
wrongful act. . . pI 
Here ,  s ince there was no i ndi cat ion that the defendant  control led or 
maintained the sign, the Court of Appeals reversed both the trial court and 
the appellate division which had previously allowed recovery. 
Another court was invited this year to reject limitations on the duty of 
uti l ities to furnish service. In Shubitz v. COllsolidaIed Edisoll CompallY 0/ 
,Vew York,132 a tenant sued an electric company for i njuries caused by a 
b lackout, relying on the company's contract to furnish electricity to his 
landlord. Citing the oft-quoted language of Palsgraj v .  Long Islalld R.R . . 1 l l  
which requires a finding of a duty to the specific individual complaining, and 
Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co . . ' :u in which plainti ff was den ied recovery 
against a water company which had failed to supply water required by its 
contract with the city but not with the plaintiff, the court found precedent to 
be against the plaintiff. Addressing itself to the importance of stare decisis in 
such cases, the court said: 
The court recognizes that the absence of a remedy by the tenant in an action for damage, 
leaves her without recourse and is also aware of the flexibility and creative power (If the 
law to meet the progressive developments of the age . . . .  However, It cannot reject 
principles established by sound reason or doctrines established by long experience.m 
I n  Neumann v. Shlansky;36 the court held an eleven year old golfer to 
an adult standard, relying on Section 283-a of the Second Restatement of 
1 3 1 .  Id. at 475, 248 N . E.2d at  898-99, 301  N.Y.S.2d at  62-63, tiling Cannon v.  Pfdder, 19 
App. Div. 2d 625, 626, 241 N . Y.S.2d 85,  97 (2d Dep't 1963). 
1 32. 59 Misc. 2d 732, 301 N .Y.S.2d 926 (Sup. Ct .. Kings Co. 1969). 
1 33.  248 N.Y. 339, 162 N . E. 99 ( 1928). 
1 34. 247 N . Y. 160, 1 59 N . E. 896 ( 1 928). 
1 35 .  Shubitz v. Consolidated Edison Co., supra note 1 32, at 735-36, 301 �. Y.S.2d at 930. 
1 36. 58 Misc. 2d 1 28, 294 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Westchester Co. Ct. 1968). 
HeinOnline -- 21 Syracuse L. Rev.  699 1969-1970
TOR TS 699 
T orts.ll• I f. it reasoned. a child is to be held to an adult standard when he 
drives a motor boat or airplane. his minority cannot be considered when he 
sets into motion a dangerous white missile which may also cause substantial 
injury. 
With the abandonment of strict l iabi l ity for trespass.I:.' the Court of 
A.ppeals initiated a line of cases designed to bring New York back into the 
ma instream o f  t ort law.m Abandon i ng l i ab i l i ty  for t respass requi red 
confronting anew the question of strict l iability. Especially awkward were the 
cast:s which d ist i ngu ished bet ween vibration damage and m issiles. both 
resulting from blasting.lI11 The Court hinted broadly in Schalnsky v. A ugustus 
I .  Riegel, Inc, 1 l I  that the time had come to repudiate such doctrines. Not 
willing to take the hint. the Appellate Division. Third Department. in Hom 
l'. Slale.1 I! denied recovery in the absence of a demonstration of negligence for 
vibration damage. stating that if precedent was to be overruled the overruling 
should be done by an authoritative source and not by mere interpretation or 
prediction of an intermediate appellate court.1 lJ Three months later. without 
citing the appellate division decision. the Court of A ppeals provided the 
guidance the appell ate division had wanted in Spano v. Perini Corp . . ' H  
unequivocally repudiating prior law and holding that "since blasting involves 
a substantial risk of harm no matter the degree of care exercised. we perceive 
no reason for ever permitting a person who engages in such an activity to 
i m pOSt: this  r isk upon nearby persons  or property wi thout  ass u m ing 
responsibility therefor ."11.; 
l\lI�CI:l. 1..\:-:L\ 
There has been a long-s tand ing debate co ncern ing the statute of  
limitations in medical malpractice cases. When does the statute begin to run? 
Is it when the negligent act is committed or when it is discovered? In Sc!nl'arl= 
l'. Heydell .\'ell'porl Chemical CO . . ' I,; the Court of Appeals held that with 
respect to medical treatment the relevant time was the time of administration 
of the treatment. This year it was asked to decide whether that ruling applied 
as well to cases in which foreign objects were left in the patient's body. It  said 
it did not. Where a foreign object is le ft in a patient's body. the statute of 
1 37. Rl �T.\TE\IE·'-T OF TORTS (SI,CO"\[) § 2))3A(c) ( 1 959). 
1 3)). Phillip> \'. Sun Oil Co .. 307 N.Y.  328. 1 2 1  N.E.2d 249 ( 1954). 
1 39. Sec AI�\ander. Tvrls, 1968 SUrI't'.!' vI Yt'1I' ) 'orl. Lair, 20 S\ RAC l SI' L. RI·\,. 424. at 
474 ( 1 969), 
140. Id. 
1 4 1 .  9 N.Y.2d 493. 1 74 N .E .2d 730. 2 1 5  N. Y.S.2d 52 ( 1 96 1 ). 
142. 3 1  App. Div. 2d 364. 297 N. Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dep't 1969). 
143. Id at 365. 297 N .Y.S.2d at 797. 
144, 25 N. Y.2d 1 1 . 250 N . E.2d 3 1 .  302 N . Y.S.2d 527 ( 1 969). 
145. Id. at 1 8. 250 N .E.2d at 35. 302 N. Y.S.2d at 532. 
146. 1 2 N .Y.2d 2 1 2. 188 N. E.2d 142. 237 N .Y.S.2d 7 1 4 ( 1963). 
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l imitations wi l l  not begin to run unt i l  the patient could reasonably ha\'e 
d i scovered the  malpract i ce}H Thus.  the Court consciously adopted the 
position held by a minority of jurisdictions. being persuaded that the ba�ic 
log ic  of the other jur isd ictions having adopted a s imi lar rule was more 
persuasive than the number of jurisdictions in opposition. The Court was also 
unpersuaded by the failure of the Legislature to pass a series of remedial bilb 
that had been introduced to it to accomplish the same result. I t  refused to read 
legislative inaction as tantamount to negative action. I t  stated that the Court 
would be remiss in its duties if it surrendered its own right to act merdy 
because a period of time had elapsed in which the Legislature had not acted."' 
Commenting on the peculiar court-legislature interaction. the majority 
noted: 
Courts and legislatures need not be viewed as antagonists in the area of tort la\\ . 
Developing the law is the province of both. and the peculiar attributes of these institutions 
are complementary in getting the task performed. Judicial action is often necessary to 
bring to the attention of the Legislature a particular problem in order for it to accomphsh 
the necessary form which only legislative action can fashion. . . .  
Where a court makes what appears to be a needed adjustment in an area in \\ hich 
the Legislat ure had fai led to act. the Legislature is not thereby foreclosed from 
action . . . .  The Legislature. because of its flexibility. may wish. after consideration. to 
place an outside limit on bringing a cause of action in foreign object cases and may also 
wish to review the applicable time for the running of the Statute of Limitations for 
medical malpractice medication and treatment cases. Such action \\ill. of course. be 
entirely appropriate as is ours. in the absence of legislative mandate.''' 
Again. the Court clearly indicated that it was considering carefully its role as 
an initiator of new legal principles. 
147. Flanagan v. Mt. Eden Gen. Hosp .• 24 N. Y.2d 427. 248 N.E.2d 87 1 .  301 N .Y.S.2d 23 
(l969). 
1 48. ld. at 432-34. 248 N. E.2d at 874-75. 301 N. Y.S.2d at 28-29. 
149. ld. at 435. 248 N.E.2d at 876. 30 1 N. Y.S.2d at 30. 
